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Case CaptionCase No.Topics and IssuesAuthorCitation / CountyDecidedPostedWebCite
State v. Sweeting C-170512. 513SEX OFFENSES – REGISTRATION – RES JUDICATA – COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL – APPELLATE REVIEW: The trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, which charged him with failing to provide periodic verification of his current address on or about December 27, 2016, on the ground that defendant’s duty to register had expired where in a prior case defendant had sought registration credit and an order terminating his sex-offender registration requirement; the judge in the prior case had determined that defendant had to register until at least May of 2017; and the amount of registration credit to which defendant was entitled and the length of his remaining reporting period were actually litigated and determined in the prior case, and were necessary to the court’s final judgment in that case: defendant was precluded by collateral estoppel from relitigating those issues in the present case. Where the trial court’s entry on defendant’s motion for credit of time and to terminate his registration requirement stated in the caption that the motion was denied but stated in the body that it was granted, and the record showed that the court had overruled the motion in its entirety, the state was not aggrieved by the court’s order, and therefore, cannot appeal from it.ZayasHamilton 5/22/2019 5/22/2019 2019-Ohio-1970
U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Cincinnati C-170526, C-170536; C-180093MUNICIPAL – IMMUNITY – LANDLORD/TENANT –JURISDICTION: Where the landlord city and lessees had entered into a lease pursuant to an urban renewal project, landlord city’s operation of buildings used in connection with the urban renewal project through lease enforcement fell within the ambit of governmental function. Landlord city was immune from lessees’ equitable defenses, which alleged that the city had waived its rights to enforce certain lease provisions by failing to assert them for over 20 years, because the city was engaged in a governmental function in enforcing a lease entered into under an urban renewal project. Lessees’ appeal from the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of landlord city did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to enter a writ of possession and a writ of forcible entry and detainer where the trial court was enforcing its prior judgment. The trial court did not err in ordering lessees to turn over to the city items such as lease documents, alarm codes, elevator codes, and building keys, even though the city had not requested that specific relief, where lessees never made an argument as to why the city was not entitled to the relief, and where granting the relief effectuated the trial court’s order of possession, and thus, was equitable under the circumstances.CrouseHamilton 5/15/2019 5/15/2019 2019-Ohio-1866
In re S.D. C-180020, C-180021, C-180022DELINQUENCY – SELF-DEFENSE – WEAPONS – TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE : Where the juvenile failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he had not violated any duty to retreat or avoid the danger, his adjudication for discharging a firearm on or near a public road or highway was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Where the juvenile fired his weapon in a gas station parking lot in the presence of multiple people before tossing the weapon to an acquaintance who, along with the juvenile, fled from the scene, it could reasonably be inferred that the juvenile had knowledge that an investigation into his actions was likely and that he had handed off the weapon with the specific intent to impair its availability, and therefore, his adjudication for tampering with evidence was supported by sufficient evidence. Where the evidence established that the juvenile had concealed a weapon on his person before producing the weapon and firing it in a gas station parking lot, his adjudication for carrying a concealed weapon was supported by the sufficiency and the weight of the evidence.MyersHamilton 5/15/2019 5/15/2019 2019-Ohio-1867
Cincinnati v. Fourth Natl. Realty, L.L.C. C-180156, C-180174DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – MUNICIPAL – ZONING – JURISDICTION – R.C. 2721.12 – STANDING: Where defendant had challenged two zoning provisions that regulated the content of advertising signs as being unconstitutionally overbroad because they restricted protected noncommercial speech, and where amendments to the zoning code that occurred during the course of litigation resulted in those provisions no longer restricting protected noncommercial speech, defendant’s overbreadth challenge to the provisions was rendered moot. Defendant’s constitutional challenge, as applied to a proposed legally-sized-off-site sign, to two zoning provisions that regulated the content of advertising signs based on whether they were classified as on-site or off-site was not rendered moot by amendments to the zoning code that occurred during the course of litigation where defendant’s proposed sign was in violation of the provisions both before and after the amendments. Where, in a declaratory-judgment action, defendant served the Attorney General with its counterclaim that contained a constitutional challenge by personal service in accordance with Civ.R. 4.1, and where the Attorney General had time to review the matter and elected not to participate in the action, neither party was prejudiced by the late service on the Attorney General and the trial court did not err in determining that defendant had complied with R.C. 2721.12. Where defendant did not own the wall on which it sought to place an off-site sign, but defendant had obtained permission to hang its sign on the wall and would suffer financially if the city’s off-site sign prohibition provisions were enforced, defendant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the city’s off-site sign prohibition provisions.MyersHamilton 5/15/2019 5/15/2019 2019-Ohio-1868
Downtime Rebuild, L.L.C. v. Trinity Logistics, Inc. C-180157CARRIER LIABILITY – CARMACK AMENDMENT – EVIDENCE – DAMAGES: The trial court erred in holding defendant carriers liable under the Carmack Amendment for damages to two CNC computer machines where plaintiff buyer of the machines, which had hired defendants to transport the machines, failed to prove that the machines were delivered to the carriers in good condition, and so failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of carrier liability. The trial court did not err in awarding plaintiff buyer damages for chip conveyors, which were damaged by the carriers’ negligence, and for missing components for the CNC machines.CrouseHamilton 5/15/2019 5/15/2019 2019-Ohio-1869
State v. Carter C-170655POSTCONVICTION—JURISDICTION—RES JUDICATA: Defendant’s postconviction motion for relief from judgment was subject to dismissal without a hearing: the motion was not reviewable under Civ.R. 60(B), but was reviewable under R.C. 2953.21 et seq., governing the proceedings on a petition for postconviction relief; but the postconviction statutes did not confer jurisdiction to entertain his late challenge to his 2015 conviction, res judicata barred his timely challenge to his 2016 conviction, and neither challenge would have rendered his convictions void. A court of appeals has no jurisdiction to review an assignment of error challenging a common pleas court’s judgment overruling defendant’s motion requesting recusal from deciding his postconviction motion for relief from his convictions.MyersHamilton 5/8/2019 5/8/2019 2019-Ohio-1749
Sweeney v. Sweeney C-180076DOMESTIC RELATIONS – DIVORCE AND DISSOLUTION: The determination of whether a parent is voluntarily underemployed and the amount of potential income to be imputed to him or her, are matters to be determined by the trial court based upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s determination on these matters absent an abuse of discretion; while this is a deferential standard, a trial court can abuse its discretion where there is no evidence in the record to support its findings or where the court employs the wrong legal standard. In calculating child support, a trial court must first determine the annual income for each parent; the income for a parent who is voluntarily underemployed is the sum of any gross income and any potential income attributable to that parent; potential income includes imputed income that the court determines the parent would have earned based on specified criteria found in former R.C. 3119.01(C)(11)(a), including the age and any special needs of the children and factors relating to the parent, such as the parent’s prior employment experience, education, skills and training, and employment availability, as well as the local wages available to be earned, and imputed income from any nonincome-producing assets of the parent under former R.C. 3119.01(C)(11)(b). A voluntary reduction in income is not sufficient in and of itself to establish that potential income should be imputed to a parent; the test is not only whether the change was voluntary, but also whether it was made with due regard to the parent’s income-producing abilities and his duty to provide for the continuing needs of the children. Where the reviewing court cannot ascertain whether the trial court modifying a child-support order determined, as an initial matter, whether it was ruling on a motion to modify custody and child-support obligations under a split-parenting motion or under a subsequent jointly requested shared-parenting plan, which was the matter ultimately before the court, the trial court’s judgment must be reversed. A trial court must use the child-support calculation worksheet which corresponds with the parenting plan that it has ordered. When the trial court employs the wrong worksheet and considers the wrong factors, its ruling must be reversed.ZayasHamilton 5/8/2019 5/8/2019 2019-Ohio-1750
State v. Millow C-180259NEW TRIAL – APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL: The common pleas court did not err in overruling, or abuse its discretion in denying a hearing on, defendant’s Crim.R. 33(B) motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial under Crim.R. 33(A)(2) and (A)(6), because the court had before it competent and credible evidence to support a determination that defendant had failed to sustain his burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence demonstrating unavoidable prevention: the motion’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the adequacy of the indictment, bill of particulars, and jury instructions, along with allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel, depended for their resolution upon matters contained in the trial record; and allegedly exculpatory outside evidence offered in support of the motion’s actual-innocence claim was known to defendant at the time of trial, but was not offered at trial during defendant’s trial testimony or through the testimony of others.BergeronHamilton 5/8/2019 5/8/2019 2019-Ohio-1751
State v. Fannon C-180270APPELLATE REVIEW/CRIMINAL – SEX OFFENSES – CRIM.R. 11 – PLEAS – MANDATORY SENTENCE – TIER CLASSIFICATION: Defendant’s assignment of error, which alleges that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because the trial court did not inform him prior to accepting his pleas about his Tier III sex-offender classification and registration requirements, must be overruled where defendant’s Tier III classification was not included in the judgment of conviction and sentence: where defendant’s Tier III classification was not included in the judgment of conviction and sentence, he is not subject to Tier III classification and registration requirements, because those sanctions were never imposed; therefore, the appellate court cannot decide and defendant cannot show that his guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary on the basis that he was not informed about them. Where a review of the record shows that defendant was not unaware of or confused about the applicability of mandatory prison time as a result of his pleas, the trial court’s inaccurate reference to community control did not rise to the level of a misrepresentation that would have affected his decision to plead guilty, and therefore, defendant cannot show prejudice.BergeronHamilton 5/8/2019 5/8/2019 2019-Ohio-1752
State v. Hodgkin C-170689SEX OFFENSES – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CRIMINAL – EIGHTH AMENDMENT – CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT – NOTIFICATION OF REGISTRATION DUTIES – EVIDENCE – SEXUAL IMPOSITION – FALSE IMPRISONMENT: Defendant bus driver’s conviction for false imprisonment was not against the sufficiency or weight of the evidence where defendant got on top of his 17-year-old victim and refused to let her up, even when she told him to get off of her, and then refused to open the bus door so that the victim could leave the bus. Defendant bus driver’s conviction for sexual imposition was not against the sufficiency or weight of the evidence: the evidence supported the inference that the purpose of his actions was sexual gratification or arousal where defendant looked at this 17-year-old victim in the rear-view mirror in a way that made her uncomfortable, touched the victim on her chest and inner thigh while “tickling” her, slapped her on the buttocks, got on top of the victim and refused to get off of her until she called him “the man,” and refused to let her leave the bus until she had given him her “name and number.” R.C. Chapter 2950’s Tier I sex-offender-registration statutes, which require defendant to register for 15 years and to annually verify his address, are not unconstitutional as applied, because they do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 9, of the Ohio Constitution as they are not so extreme as to be grossly disproportionate to his sexual-imposition crime or shocking to a reasonable person or to the community’s sense of justice: defendant was more culpable and deserving of punishment based on the circumstances of his offense; his 15-year registration period is not so severe as to reach the level of unconstitutionality; and the imposition of a registration period satisfies the penological aim of reducing recidivism among sex offenders. Where the trial court failed to notify defendant of his Tier I sex-offender registration and verification duties, the cause must be remanded for the trial court to properly notify defendant of his registration and verification duties pursuant to R.C. 2950.03.ZayasHamilton 5/3/2019 5/3/2019 2019-Ohio-1686